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Abstract 
A small segment of credit default swaps (CDS) on residential mortgage 
backed securities (RMBS) stand implicated in the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis. The 
dominance of a few big players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance 
for CDS credit risk mitigation for banks’ assets has led to the idea of too 
interconnected to fail (TITF) resulting, as in the case of AIG, of a tax payer 
bailout. We provide an empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network 
based on the FDIC Call Reports for oﬀ balance sheet bank data for the 
4th quarter in 2007 and 2008. The propagation of ﬁnancial contagion in 
networks with dense clustering which reﬂects high concentration or localiza­
tion of exposures between few participants will be identiﬁed as one that is 
TITF. Those that dominate in terms of network centrality and connectivity 
are called ‘super-spreaders’. Management of systemic risk from bank failure 
in uncorrelated random networks is diﬀerent to those with clustering. As 
systemic risk of highly connected ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the CDS (or any other) 
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ﬁnancial markets is not priced into their holding of capital and collateral, 
we design a super-spreader tax based on eigenvector centrality of the banks 
which can mitigate potential socialized losses. 
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps, Financial Networks, Eigenvector 
Centrality, Financial contagion, Systemic Risk, Super-spreader tax 
1 1. Introduction 
2 The 2007 ﬁnancial crisis which started as the US ‘sub-prime’ crisis, through 
3 a process of ﬁnancial contagion led to the demise of major banks and also 
4 precipitated severe economic contraction the world over. Since 2008, tax 
5 payer bailout and socialization of losses in the ﬁnancial system has trans­
6 formed the banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone. In 
7 the 2002-2007 period, credit risk transfer (CRT) from bank balance sheets 
8 and the use of credit derivatives to insure against default risk of reference 
9 assets has involved big US banks and non-bank FIs in the credit derivatives 
10 market which is dominated by credit default swaps (CDS). This market has 
11 become a source of market expectations on the probability of default of the 
12 reference entity which since 2008 has increasingly included high CDS spreads 
13 on sovereigns and FIs. Banks are major protection buyers and sellers in this 
14 market and have become vulnerable as a result. Due to inherent structural 
15 weaknesses of the CDS market and also those factors arising from poor reg­
16 ulatory design, as will be explained, CDS which constitute up to 98% of 
17 credit derivatives have had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play 
18 in the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis. This paper will be concerned with modelling 
19 a speciﬁc weakness of CDS which is also well known for other modern risk 
20 sharing institutions involving over-the-counter (OTC) ﬁnancial derivatives, 
21 and this pertains to the heavy concentration of derivatives activities among 
22 a few main participants. 
23 The key elements of ﬁnancial crises, the case of 2007 ﬁnancial crisis being 
24 no exception, is the growth of innovations in private sector liquidity and 
25 leverage creation which are almost always collateralized by assets that are 
26 procyclically sensitive, viz. those that lose value with market downturns.2 
2The use of procyclical RMBS assets as collateral for bank liabilities in asset backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits in the repo market is given as a fundamental reason 
for the contraction of liquidity and the run on the repo markets in the 2007 crisis, Gorton 
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27
 The speciﬁc institutional propagators of the 2007 crisis involved residential

28 mortgage backed securities (RMBS) which suﬀered substantial mark downs 
29 with the collapse of US house prices.3 Then it was a case of risk sharing 
30 arrangements that went badly wrong. This came about due to the role of CDS 
31
 in the CRT scheme of Basel II and its precursor in the US, the Joint Agencies

32
 Rule 66 Federal Regulations 56914 and 59622 which became eﬀective on

33
 January 1, 2002. This occurred in the context of synthetic securitization and

34
 of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) which led to unsustainable

35
 trends and to systemic risk. Both holders of the RMBS and CMO assets in

36 the banking sector and those servicing credit risk via the CDS market (cf. 
37 American Insurance Group (AIG)) required tax-payer bailouts.4 
38 The Basel II risk weighting scheme for CRT of assets on bank balance 
39
 sheets and its forerunner in the US which set out the capital treatment in the

40
 Synthetic Collateralized Loan Obligations guidance published by the Oﬃce

41
 of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC 99-43) for the 2002 Joint Agencies

42
 Rule 66, stand implicated for turbo charging a process of leverage that in­

43
 creased connectivity between depository institutions and as yet unregulated

44
 non-depository ﬁnancial intermediaries and derivatives markets. Under Basel

45
 I since 1988, a standard 8% regulatory capital requirement applied to banks

46
 with very few exceptions for the economic default risk of assets being held

47
 by banks. In the run up to Basel II since 2004 and under the 2002 US Joint

48 Agencies Rule 66, the 50% risk weight which implied a capital charge of 4% 
(2009). The loss of conﬁdence arising from the uncertainty as to which bank is holding 
impaired RMBS assets that were non-traded, typically called a problem of asymmetric 
information, exacerbated the problem. 
3See, Brunnermeier (2009), Stulz (2010), Ashcroft and Schuermann (2008) and Gorton 
and Metrich (2009). They, respectively, cover the unfolding phases of the crisis, the speciﬁc 
characteristics of credit derivatives, the features relevant to sub-prime securitization and 
the collateralized debt obligations. 
4Kiﬀ et al. (2009) place the size of increased collateral calls on AIG’s CDS guarantees 
following its ratings downgrades at a relatively modest $15 bn that is was unable to 
meet. While the current cost to the US tax payer of the AIG bailout stands at $170 bn, 
the initial $85 bn payment to AIG was geared toward honouring its CDS obligations to 
counterparties totalling over $66.2 bn. These include payouts to Goldman Sachs ($12.9 
billion), Merrill Lynch ($6.8 bn), Bank of America ($5.2 bn), Citibank ($2.3 bn) and 
Wachovia ($1.5 bn). Foreign banks were also beneﬁciaries, including Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale and 
Deutsche Bank, which each received nearly $12 bn; Barclays ($8.5 bn); and UBS ($5 bn). 
The following 15 March 2009 press release “AIG Discloses Counterparties to CDS, GIA 
and Securities Lending Transactions” provides useful information. 
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49 on residential mortgages could be reduced to a mere 1.6% through the process 
50 of synthetic securitization and external ratings which implied 5 times more 
51 leverage in the system.5 In synthetic securitization and CRT, an originating 
52 bank uses CDS or guarantees to transfer the credit risk, in whole or in part, of 
53 one or more underlying exposures to third-party protection providers. Thus, 
54 in synthetic securitization, the underlying exposures remain on the balance 
55 sheet of the originating bank, but the credit exposure of the originating bank 
56 is transferred to the protection provider or covered by collateral pledged by 
57 the protection provider. This strongly incentivized the use of CDS by banks 
58 which began to hold more MBS on their balance sheets and also brought 
59 AAA players such as AIG, hedge funds and erstwhile municipal bond insur­
60 ers called Monolines into the CDS market as protection sellers.6 Only banks 
61 were subject to capital regulation while about 49% (see, British Bankers 
62 Association for 2006 for the breakdown of institutions involved as CDS pro­
63 tection sellers and buyers) of those institutions which were CDS sellers in the 
64 form of thinly capitalized hedge funds and Monolines,7 were outside the reg­
65 ulatory boundary. This introduced signiﬁcant weakness to the CRT scheme 
66 leading to the criticism that the scheme was more akin to banks and other 
67 net beneﬁciaries of CDS purchasing insurance from passengers on the Ti­
68 tanic. Indeed, a little known Monoline called ACA which failed to deliver 
69 on the CDS protection for RMBS held by Merrill Lynch is what ﬁnally led 
70 to its absorption by Bank of America.8 Further, as cited in the ECB CDS 
71 Report (ECB, 2009, p.57-58), in its 2007 SEC ﬁling, AIG FP (the hedge 
5The risk weight of 20% applies when a bank asset has CDS protection from an AAA 
rated guarantor. 
6Acharya and Richardson (2010), Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008), Hellwig 
(2010), Markose et al. (2010, 2012) have given detailed analyses of how the regulatory 
framework based on risk weighting of capital and CRT resulted in perverse incentives 
which left the ﬁnancial system overleveraged and insolvent. 
7At the end of 2007, AMBAC, MBIA and FSA accounted for 70% of the CDS contracts 
provided by Monolines with the ﬁrst two accounting for $625 bn and $546 bn of this. The 
capital base of Monolines was approximately $20 bn and their insurance guarantees are to 
the tune of $2.3 tn implying leverage of 115. 
8Standard and Poor Report of August 2008 states that Merrill Lynch had CDS cover 
from Monolines to the tune of $18.8bn and of that ACA accounted for $5bn. ACA, 
29% of which was owned by Bear Stearns, along with other Monolines suﬀered a ratings 
downgrade in early 2008 and ACA demised in 2008 defaulting on its CDS obligations. 
ACA had $69 bn of CDS obligations and only had $425 million worth of capital. 
4 
Figure 1: Credit Default Swaps Outstanding Gross Notional. Source: BIS December 07, 
June 08 which include all CDS contracts; DTCC for other dates record only 90% of CDS. 
72 fund component of AIG) explicitly stated that it supplied CDS guarantees, 
73
 in particular to European banks, in order for them to reduce capital require­

74
 ments. The beneﬁts that accrued to banks from CRT fell far short of the

75
 intended default risk mitigation objectives and as shown by Markose et al.

76
 (2012) participants of the CRT scheme were driven primarily by short term

77
 returns from the leveraged lending using CDS in synthetic CDOs as collateral

78
 in a carry trade.

79
 Figure 1 shows how the CDS market peaked at about $58 trillion in the

80
 run up to the 2007 crisis. In the post Lehman period the gross notional

81
 value9 of CDS has contracted due to the compression of CDS contracts with

82
 bilateral tear ups and a decline of CDS issuance. Tranche CDS shrank faster

83
 than single name CDS. During the short lived period of the CDO market

84
 for RMBS which peaked at over $2 trillion in 2007, about $1 trillion of the

85
 tranche based CDS was on sub-prime RMBS.

86
 Undoubtedly, the main rationale behind CRT in the context of credit

87
 derivatives which led regulators to endorse these activities (see, e.g., IMF

9Following the DTCC, the CDS notional refers to the par value of the credit protection 
bought or sold. Gross notional value reported on a per trade basis is the sum of the CDS 
contracts bought (or equivalently sold) in aggregate. 
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88 (2002); OECD (2002); IAIS (2003); BIS (2004)) is that it allows ﬁnancial 
89 intermediaries (FIs) to diversify away concentrated exposures on their bal­
90 ance sheet by moving the risks to AAA rated institutions that seem better 
91 placed to deal with them. However, similar to the argument made by Darby 
92 (1994) about derivatives markets in general in their role in risk sharing, many 
93 have noted (see, Persuad (2002), Lucas et al. (2007), Das (2010) and Gibson 
94 (2007)) that the beneﬁts of CRT will be compromised by the structural con­
95 centration of the CDS market. Clearly, Basel II and III schemes for CRT10 
96 suﬀer from the fallacy of composition. The premise that the transfer of credit 
97 risk from banks’ balance sheets, which is a good thing from the perspective 
98 of a bank especially as the capital savings incentives allow short run asset 
99 expansion, will also lead to diversiﬁcation of risk does not follow at a collec­
100 tive level. There is growing counterparty and systemic risk due to fragility in 
101 the network structures. Few have provided tools to quantitatively model and 
102 visualize the systemic risk consequences of what is called too interconnected 
103 to fail (TITF) that come with high concentration of CDS counterparties.11 
104 Markose et al. (2012) has pointed out that the fallacy of composition type er­
105 rors can be reduced with holistic visualization of the interconnections between 
106 counterparties using ﬁnancial network models. The structural signature of 
107 such ﬁnancial networks given by the heavy concentration of exposures needs 
108 to be modelled and analysed to understand the network stability properties 
109 and the way in which contagion propagates in the system. In view of the 
110 growing structural concentration in the provision of risk guarantees through 
111 ﬁnancial derivatives, we claim the topological fragility of the modern risk 
112 sharing institutions is germane to issues on systemic risk. 
113 Given the US centric nature of the CDS market for RMBS and the fact 
114 that the FDIC Call Reports comprehensively give data on gross notional, 
115 gross positive fair value (GPFV)12 and gross negative fair value (GNFV) of 
10Hellwig (2010) has correctly noted that as long as incentives for capital reduction are 
given for the use of CDS risk mitigants, it is business as usual in Basel III. 
11In the publicly available slides of a study by Cont et. al. (2009), Measuring Systemic 
Risk in Financial Networks cited in the 2009 ECB CDS Report (ECB, 2009), Cont et. 
al. simulate the CDS market network connectivity and exposure sizes on the basis of 
the empirical properties of the Brazilian and Austrian interbank markets. We maintain 
that the CDS market, especially as it aﬀects US bank solvency, has considerably more 
clustering and concentration risk than interbank markets. 
12The sum total of the fair values of contracts involves the money owed to a bank by its 
counterparties, without taking into account netting. This represents the maximum losses 
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116 CDS for all FDIC FIs, this paper will conﬁne the CDS network model to 
117 ﬁt the FDIC data set. Note, the activities of the FDIC ﬁnancial ﬁrms are 
118 given in their capacity as national associations rather than in terms of global 
119 consolidated holdings. The number of US FDIC ﬁnancial ﬁrms involved 
120 in CDS is very few ranging from between 26-38 or so in the period since 
121 2006 when this data has been reported. In 2006, we ﬁnd that that top 5 
122 US banks (J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Citibank, Morgan Stanley and 
123 Goldman Sachs) accounts for 95% of gross notional sell and over 97% in 
124 2007 of the total CDS gross notional sell of FDIC banks. In terms of the 
125 $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for 2008 Q4 given by BIS and 
126 DTCC, these top 5 US banks account for 92% of market share. Of the top 
127 100 SP-500 ﬁrms surveyed by Fitch in 2009 for derivatives use13, only 17 were 
128 found to be active in the CDS market and the top 5 US banks accounted for 
129 96% of CDS gross notional in 2009. While the network for CDS exposures 
130 for US banks in the 2007 Q4 period showed that Monolines and insurance 
131 companies were dominant as CDS protections sellers, by 2008 Q4 we have 
132 an even greater dominance of 5 US banks in the CDS market. This came 
133 about with the demise or merger of investment banks Bear Stearns, Lehman 
134 Brothers and Merrill Lynch, contraction of CDS activities by the Monolines 
135 and the nationalization of AIG. It is a sobering fact that the origins of the 
136 ﬁnancial contagion as it emanated from CDS on RMBS on US banks’ balance 
137 sheets accounts for only 13% of gross notional of total US bank holdings of 
138 CDS in 2006 Q1 and falling to 7% in 2007 Q2 (see Markose et al. (2012)). 
139 This paper is concerned with characterizing the systemic risk from this 
140 class of derivatives by considering the topology of the ﬁnancial network for 
141 counterparty exposures. Following the methods of the IBM project of MIDAS 
142 (see, Balakrishnan et al. (2010)) which aims to automate, access and visualize 
143 large ﬁnancial datasets this paper will use the Markose et al. (2010) network 
144 ‘visualizer’ for the CDS activities of FDIC ﬁrms. One of the objectives of the 
145 paper is to highlight the hierarchical core-periphery type structures within a 
a bank could incur if all its counterparties default and there is no netting of contracts, and 
the bank holds no counter-party collateral. Fair values are market determined or model 
determined. 
13The report by Fitch Ratings, 2009, “Derivatives: a Closer Look at What New Disclo­
sures in the U.S. Reveal”. The 100 companies reviewed were those with the highest levels 
of total outstanding debt in the S&P 1,500 universe. They represent approximately 75% 
of the total debt of S&P 1,500 companies. 
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146 highly sparse adjacency matrix to give a more precise depiction of ﬁnancial 
147 ﬁrms being TITF in that the highly connected ﬁnancial ﬁrms will bring down 
148 similarly connected ﬁnancial ﬁrms implying large socialized loss of capital for 
149 the system as a whole. It aims to give a more rigorous characterization in 
150 terms of network statistics of extreme concentration of exposures between ﬁve 
151 top US banks. We will highlight the high asymmetry in network connectivity 
152 of the nodes and high clustering of the network involving a few central hub 
153 banks (some-times called the ‘rich club’) which are broker-dealers in of the 
154 CDS network. 
155 By its nature of being a negative externality, systemic risk implications of 
156 a bank’s connectivity and concentration of obligations are not factored into 
157 the capital or collateral being held by banks. In a ratings based system, as 
158 succinctly pointed out by Haldane (2009), leniency of capital and collateral 
159 requirements for a few large highly rated FIs has resulted in excessive expan­
160 sion of credit and derivatives activities by them which is far beyond what can 
161 be sustained in terms of system stability. Haldane (2009) calls such highly 
162 interconnected ﬁnancial intermediaries ‘super-spreaders’ and we will retain 
163 this epithet in the ﬁnancial network modelling that follows. Haldane (2009) 
164 recommends that super-spreaders should have larger buﬀers. We design a 
165 super-spreader tax based on eigenvector centrality of the nodes and we test 
166 it for its eﬃcacy to reduce potential socialized losses. 
167 Section 2 gives a brief description of CDS and discusses the potential 
168 systemic risk threats that arise from them. This includes the practice of 
169 oﬀsetting which creates dense connections between broker-dealers. In Section 
170 3, we will brieﬂy review the technical aspects of network theory and the 
171 economics literature on ﬁnancial networks. The main drawback of the pre 
172 2007 economics literature on ﬁnancial networks has been that models that 
173 are based on empirical bilateral data between counterparties were few in 
174 number to establish ‘stylized’ facts on network structures for the diﬀerent 
175 classes of ﬁnancial products ranging from contingent claims and derivatives, 
176 credit related interbank obligations and exposures and large value payment 
177 and settlement systems. Where bilateral data on ﬁnancial exposures is not 
178 available, both empirical and theoretical models assumed network structures 
179 to be either uncorrelated random ones (see, Nier et al. (2007)) or complete 
180 network structures (see, Upper and Worms (2004)). As will be argued, these 
181 approaches crucially do not have what we call the TITF characteristics. 
182 While the stability of ﬁnancial networks have been usually investigated using 
183 the classic Furﬁne (2003) algorithm, suﬃcient emphasis has not been given 
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184 to the way in which contagion propagates in highly tiered and clustered 
185 networks and stability of the system in terms of network characteristics has 
186 not been studied. Section 4 discusses the necessary network stability results 
187 and derives the super-spreader tax fund that can mitigate potential socialized 
188 losses from the failure of highly connected banks. The super-spreader tax is 
189 based on the eigenvector centrality of the FI in order to internalize the system 
190 wide losses of capital that will occur by failure of big CDS broker-dealers. 
191 In the empirical Section 5, a quantitative analysis leading to the empirical 
192 reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the FDIC Q4 2007 and Q4 
193 2008 data is given in order to conduct a series of stress tests that investi­
194 gate the consequences of the high concentration of activity of 5 US banks. 
195 In 2007 Q4, non-bank FIs such as Monolines and hedge funds are found to 
196 be dominant in terms of eigenvector centrality. In 2008 Q4, J.P. Morgan is 
197 identiﬁed as the main super-spreader. The substantial threat to US banks 
198 from non-US (mainly European) banks as net CDS sellers is also identiﬁed. 
199 An equivalent uncorrelated random network equivalent in size, connectivity 
200 and total GNFV and GPFV for each bank is also constructed and systemic 
201 risk from bank failure in uncorrelated random networks is shown to be dif­
202 ferent from the empirically calibrated CDS network. Results are provided 
203 on how the super-spreader tax fund operates. Section 6 concludes the paper 
204 and outlines future work. 
205 2. Over the Counter CDS Contracts: Potential Systemic Risk Threats 
206 2.1. CDS Contract and Inherent Problems 
207 A single name credit default swap is a bilateral credit derivative contract 
208 speciﬁed over a period, typically 5 years, with its payoﬀs linked to a credit 
209 event such as default on debt, restructuring or bankruptcy of the underlying 
210 corporate or government entity. The occurrence of such a credit event can 
211 trigger the CDS insurance payment by the protection seller who is in receipt 
212 of periodic premia from the protection buyer. Figure 2 sets out the structure 
213 of a CDS contract. 
214 Every over the counter (OTC) CDS contract is bilaterally and privately 
215 negotiated and the respective counterparties and the contracts remain in 
216 force till the maturity date. This raises problems with regard to counterparty 
217 risk and also indicates why gross exposure matters. The periodic payments 
218 of premia are based on the CDS spread and quoted as a percentage of the 
219 gross notional value of the CDS at the start of the contract. The CDS 
9 
Figure 2: Credit Default Swap Structure, CDS Chain and Bear Raid. Note: Direction of 
CDS sale or protection guarantee is the unbroken arrow. 
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220 spreads being quoted ﬂuctuate over time. As the payoﬀ on a CDS contract 
221 is triggered by the default on debt, the CDS spread represents, in general, 
222 credit worthiness of the reference entity and speciﬁcally, the probability of 
223 default and the recovery value of the reference assets. All else being equal, 
224 higher spreads indicate growing market expectations of the default on the 
225 debt with a jump to default spike at the time of the credit event. Net CDS 
226 sellers and their counterparties holding impaired CDS reference assets may 
227 also ﬁnd that CDS spreads on themselves as reference entities are adversely 
228 aﬀected. This could hasten their own insolvency as liquidity risk in the form 
229 of the ability to raise funds is aﬀected. This has been called ‘wrong way 
230 risk’. The 2009 ECB CDS report estimated this as the correlation in the 
231 CDS spreads of CDS sellers and their respective reference entities, and ﬁnds 
232 this has grown for sellers of CDS which rely on government bailout and then 
233 sell CDS with their respective sovereigns as reference entities. Circularity of 
234 risk arises from the fact that as noted by the DTCC in December 2008, 7 top 
235 dealers are themselves among the 10 top reference entities by net protection 
236 amounts.14 
237 Hence, CDS spreads have strong self-reﬂexive properties in that they do 
238 not merely reﬂect the ﬁnancial state of the underlying obligor, they can 
239 in turn accelerate the default event as ratings downgrade follow, cost of 
240 capital rises and stock market valuation falls for the obligor as the CDS 
241 spreads on them increase. These systemic risk factors are hard to model in 
242 formulaic CDS pricing models and hence such counterparty and circular risk 
243 are typically not modelled in CDS pricing models. 
244 The controversial aspect about a CDS that makes the analogy with an 
245 insurance contract of limited use is that the buyer of a CDS need not own any 
246 underlying security or have any credit exposure to the reference entity that 
247 needs to be hedged. The so called naked CDS buy position is, therefore, a 
248 speculative one undertaken for pecuniary gain from either the cash settlement 
249 in the event of a default or a chance to oﬀset the CDS purchase with a sale at 
250 an improved CDS spread. This implies that gross CDS notional values can 
251 be several (5-10) multiples of the underlying value of the debt obligations of 
14In December 2008, the DTCC lists the following ﬁnancial reference entities by net 
protection amounts: GE Capital ($11.074 bn), Deutsche Bank ($7.163 bn), Bank of Amer­
ica ($6.797 bn), Morgan Stanley ($6.318 bn), Goldman Sachs ($5.211 bn), Merill Lynch 
($5.211 bn), Berkshire Hathaway ($4.632 bn), Barclays Bank ($4.358 bn), UBS($4.311 
bn), RBS($4.271 bn). 
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252 the reference entity. It has been widely noted that naked CDS buyers with no 
253 insurable interest will gain considerably from the bankruptcy of the reference 
254 entity. Note the ‘bear raid’ in Figure 2 refers to the possibility that when 
255 the CDS protection cover on a reference entity has been sold on to a third 
256 party, here D, who does not own the bonds of the reference entity, D has an 
257 incentive to short the stock of the reference entity to trigger its insolvency in 
258 order to collect the insurance to be paid up on the CDS. A naked CDS buy 
259 position is equivalent to shorting the reference bonds without the problems 
260 of a short squeeze that raises the recovery value of the bonds (and lowers 
261 the payoﬀ on the CDS) when short sellers of the bonds have to ‘buy back’ 
262 at time of the credit event. Hence, naked CDS buying is combined with 
263 shorting stock of the reference entity. There is also the case that even those 
264 CDS buyers who have exposure to the default risk on the debt of the reference 
265 entity may ﬁnd it more lucrative to cash in on the protection payment on 
266 the CDS with the bankruptcy of the reference entity rather than continue 
267 holding its debt. This is called the empty creditor phenomenon (see, Bolton 
268 and Oehmke (2011)). 
269 Finally, as noted by Duﬃe et al. (2010) and as what happened in the 
270 case of the Bear Stearns hedge funds that had large CMO holdings, is that 
271 there can be a ‘run’ on the collateral posted by large CDS protection sell­
272 ers if they suﬀer an actual or potential ratings downgrade. Counterparty 
273 credit risk rises to the level of systemic risk when the failure of a market 
274 participant with an extremely large derivatives portfolio can trigger large 
275 losses on its counterparties, which accelerates their failure. This can be ac­
276 companied by ﬁre sales of the collateral which can lead to signiﬁcant price 
277 volatility or price distortions. Those CDS contracts operating on the ISDA 
278 (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) rules also have a provision 
279 of cross-default. If a counterparty cannot post collateral in a speciﬁed time 
280 frame, it can deem to have defaulted and if the shortfall of collateral ex­
281 ceeds a threshold, the counterparty is deemed to have defaulted across other 
282 ISDA CDS. These cross-defaults (a potential situation that AIG was in) can 
283 trigger a domino eﬀect as all parties close out. Attempts at novating CDS 
284 contracts guaranteed by the ‘closed out’ ﬁrm especially when the underlying 
285 is potentially devalued (as in the case of RMBS assets) with other protection 
286 sellers may be diﬃcult and if successful it increases market concentration and 
287 network fragility as now there are fewer CDS protection sellers. 
12 
288 2.2. Broker-Dealer Concentration 
289 The main strategy adopted by CDS dealers and counterparties to manage 
290
 liquidity requirements is a practice called “oﬀsets” which though individually

291
 rational may collectively contribute to systemic risk as the chains of CDS

292
 obligations increase and also merge. Oﬀsets involve a strategy by which

293
 CDS participants can maximize revenue from spread trades and minimize

294
 collateral and ﬁnal payouts. In Figure 2, for example, B having bought CDS

295
 cover from C, ﬁnds that the spreads have increased and may choose to eschew

296
 its hedge on the bonds of the reference entity A to earn the diﬀerence between

297
 the premia it pays to C and the higher premia it can now charge by an oﬀset

298
 sale of CDS to D. This is marked by the red arrows in Figure 2 and is a

299
 typical spread trade. In this system, the ultimate beneﬁciary of CDS cover,

300
 in case of default of reference entity A, is the naked CDS buyer D. Assuming

301
 par value of $10m for each CDS contract and zero recovery rate on reference

302
 entity bonds in Figure 2, note in the above scenario, C has an obligation to

303
 settle $10m and then B’s obligations net to zero having settled with D. We

304 will call this an open chain or tree. 
305
 Consider the case that C oﬀsets with D (ie. the green arrows in Figure

306
 2 are active). We now have a closed chain of reﬂexive obligations (B sells to

307
 D, D sells to C and C sells to B) with the gross notional CDS value at $30m.

308
 Should the reference entity A default, then at settlement, if all parties in

309
 the CDS chain remain solvent (note that B has eschewed its hedge on the

310
 reference entity), aggregate/multilateral net CDS payouts for B, C and D are

311 zero. Zero net notional CDS value15 gives nobody any non-premia related 
312 beneﬁts, least of all cover on the reference entity bonds. If, however, any one 
313
 of the counterparties fails, say C in a double default with the reference entity

314
 A, in the closed chain of CDS obligations, the whole chain may be brought

315 down as B now has to face its obligation to D in terms of its gross amount 
15We use the DTCC deﬁnition of aggregate net notional for each reference entity, ie. the 
sum of net protection bought by net buyers (or net protection sold by net sellers). See, 
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/. This is calculated at the level of each 
CDS market participant and based on the gross notional of buy and sell CDS contracts, 
separately aggregated over all counterparties, every participant is deemed a net buyer or 
net seller. The net buyers (or net sellers) values are summed up to get the aggregate net 
notional. Note also, this assumes zero recovery rate at time of settlement. This deﬁnition 
of net notional involves multilateral netting while reduction of counterparty risk can arise 
only from what can be bilaterally netted and nulliﬁed by mutual tear ups with the failed 
counterparty. 
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316 of $10 m. 
317 Bilateral oﬀsets and a reﬂexive closed chain conﬁguration provide the 
318 most eﬃcient ex ante net settlement liquidity requirements16 if all coun­
319 terparties deliver. Bilateral oﬀsets on the same reference entity will reduce 
320 collateral requirements and also counterparty risk as there will be mutual tear 
321 ups when the counterparty fails. This is characteristic of network linkages in 
322 inter-dealer relationships (Bliss and Kaufman, 2006). It must be noted that 
323 extensive non-bilateral oﬀsets, described above, using spread trades that aim 
324 to maximize income from CDS spreads is essential for the price discovery 
325 process. It will reduce aggregate net notional but not counterparty risk as 
326 non-bilateral oﬀsets will result in clustered interconnections and a high level 
327 of systemic risk. Also, reduction in aggregate net notional comes at a price of 
328 reducing the aggregate capacity of the CDS market to deliver hedge beneﬁts 
329 on reference assets. 
330 In summary, the network topology which favours concentration of netted 
331 ﬂows between broker-dealers is eﬃcient in regard to liquidity and collateral 
332 requirements. However, it can be less stable than the one that requires more 
333 ex ante net liquidity or collateral. Liquidity or collateral provision driven 
334 from the vantage of individually rational calculations will fall short of the 
335 amounts needed for system stability (see also footnote 15). The process of 
336 oﬀsets can nullify gross obligations if the reference entity defaults, but this 
337 requires that net CDS sellers settle. Inability to do so, can make net CDS 
338 sellers the main propagators of the ﬁnancial contagion.17 The network struc­
339 ture, where key CDS net sellers with large market shares have heavy CDS 
340 activity on them as reference entities, will show up as highly interconnected 
341 linkages amongst these same players. This highly interconnected multi-hub 
16Galbiati and Giansante (2010) have also ﬁnd that networks that achieve economies 
in liquidity to be posted for settlement have reciprocal bilateral structures and also high 
interconnectivity in the form of clustering among key participants which facilitates eﬃcient 
netting. Duﬃe and Zhu (2009) are somewhat misleading about the role of bilateral netting 
in the stability of the CDS market. They emphasize the savings in liquidity but, as they 
acknowledge, their model does not deal with so called “knock-on eﬀects”, or the problem 
of how the default of one CDS counterparty can lead to a chain reaction aﬀecting others. 
17The 2009 ECB report on CDS indicates how the potential threat from AIG was not 
properly identiﬁed as the Fitch survey ranked AIG as only the 20th largest in terms of 
gross CDS obligations and failed to note that AIG was primarily a one way seller and its 
net CDS sell positions at $372 bn was double the net notional amount sold by all DTCC 
dealers combined in October 2008. 
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342
 like structure that characterizes inter-dealer CDS obligations will feature in

343
 the empirically determined CDS network model we develop.

344
 3. Financial Network Analysis 
345
 Networks are deﬁned by a pair of sets (N, E) which stand for nodes N =

346
 1, 2, 3, .., n, and E is a set of edges. In ﬁnancial networks, nodes stand for

347
 ﬁnancial entities such as banks, other ﬁnancial intermediaries and their non­

348
 ﬁnancial customers. The edges or connective links represent contractual ﬂows

349
 of liquidity and/or obligations to make payments and receive payments. Let i

350
 and j be two members of the set N . When a direct link originates with i and

351
 ends with j, viz. an out degree for i, we say that it represents payments for

352
 which i is the guarantor. Note, an agent’s out degrees corresponding to the

353
 number of its immediate neighbours is denoted by ki. In degrees represent

354
 receivables from the bank j to the bank i. In a system of linkages modelled

355
 by undirected graphs, the relationships between N agents when viewed in

356
 N × N matrix form will produce a symmetric matrix as a link between two

357
 agents will produce the same outcome whichever of the two partners initiated

358
 it. In contrast, directed graphs are useful to study relative asymmetries and

359
 imbalances in link formation and their weights.

360
 3.1. Bilateral Flow Matrices 
361
 3.1.1. Adjacency Matrix and Gross Flow Matrix For CDS 
362
 Key to the network topology is the bilateral relations between agents and

363
 is given by the adjacency matrix. Denote the (N + 1) × (N + 1) adjacency

364
 matrix A = (aij )
I , here I is the indicator function with aij = 1 if there is a

365
 link between i and j and aij = 0, if not. The N
th agent will be represented

366
 by the US non-bank sector such as Monolines, hedge funds and insurance

367
 companies. The N + 1th agent represents the non-US participants. This is

368
 also used to balance the system. The adjacency matrix becomes the gross ﬂow

369
 matrix X such that xij represents the ﬂow of gross ﬁnancial obligations from

370
 the protection seller (the row bank) to the protection buyer j (the column

371
 bank). The FDIC Call Report Data gives the Gross Negative Fair Value

372
 (GNFV) for payables and Gross Positive Fair Value (GPFV) for receivables

373
 on all CDS products that a ﬁrm is involved in with all of its counterparties.

374
 Note GNFV and GPFV is a fraction (typically by a factor of 10) of the gross

375
 notional for which the ﬁrm is a CDS seller or buyer, respectively. The total

gross payables in terms of GNFV for bank i is the sum over j columns or
376
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377 counterparties, Gi = xij while the total gross receivables or total GPFV j �

for each i is the sum taken across the i rows Bi = i xij This is shown
378 . 
379
 below : 
(1) 
380
 The zeros along the diagonal imply that banks do not lend to themselves

381
 (see, Upper, 2007) or in this case of CDS, provide protection to themselves.

382
 There can be asymmetry of entries such that for instance G1 need not equal

B1.383 However, aggregate GNFV including that of the N + 1 entity Γ = � Gi
i 
384
 will be made to balance with Φ = j Bj .

385
 3.1.2. Bilaterally Netted Matrix of Payables and Receivables 
386
 Consider a matrix M with entries (xij − xji) gives the netted position

387
 between banks i and j. For each bank i the positive entries, mij > 0, in row

388
 i give the net payables vis-a´-vis bank j and the sum of positive entries for

389
 bank i is its total bilaterally netted payables across all counterparties. This

390
 can be called i’s CDS liabilities. The sum of the negative entries, mij < 0,

391
 for each bank i in the ith row gives its total bilaterally netted receivables,

392
 which is often called CDS assets.18 Note the matrix M is skew symmetric

18Note, FDIC Call Reports give the derivatives assets (liabilities) which is the GPFV 
(GNFV) bilaterally netted by counterparty and product and also adjusted for collateral 
for each bank. However, this is reported in aggregate for all derivatives products and there 
is no publicly available bilaterally netted data on a bank’s assets and liabilities for CDS. 
Hence, what we will take the ith bank’s CDS assets and liabilities to be the sum of the 
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393 with entries mij = −mji. To analyse the dynamics of the cascade of failure of 
394
 the ith bank on the jth one, the matrix that is relevant will only contain the 
395
 positive elements of the M matrix. The direction of the contagion follows 
396
 from the failed bank i owing its counterparty j more than what j owes i. 
397
 Further, as we will discuss in the next section, it is customary for the net 
398
 exposures of bank j to bank i relative to j’s initial capital at time t, Cj0, to 
399
 be greater than a threshold (signifying a proportion of j’s capital) before j 
400
 is said to have failed. The matrix Θ that is crucial for the contagion analysis 
401
 will have elements given as follows: 
(2) 
402
 3.2. Topology of Financial Networks: Complete, Random and Uncorrelated, 
403
 Correlated and Small World

404
 Like many real world networks, namely, socio-economic, communication

405
 and information networks such as the www, ﬁnancial networks are far from

406
 random and uncorrelated. In order to construct a network for the US CDS

407
 market which shows dominance of few players with a 92% and upwards of

408
 concentration of CDS exposures, we will use what are referred to as small

409
 world networks19 (Watts (1999) and Watts and Strogatz (1998)). These

410
 networks have a top tier multi-hub of few agents who are highly connected

411
 among themselves (often called rich club dynamics) and to other nodes who

bilaterally netted positive amounts (xij − xji)+ and the sum of the bilaterally netted � j

negative amounts (xij − xji)− , respectively.
j 
19This is named after the work of the sociologist Stanley Milgram (Milgram, 1967) on 
the six degrees of separation in social networks. It has been found that globally on average 
everybody is linked to everybody else in a communication type network by no more than 
six indirect links. 
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412 show few if any connections to others in the periphery. The properties of 
413 small world networks and how contagion propagates through them will be 
414 brieﬂy contrasted with that for the uncorrelated Erdo¨s-Renyi random graph 
415 and also the Baraba´si and Albert (1999) scale free networks. 
416 Networks are mainly characterized by the following network statistics 
417 (a) Connectivity of a network is given by the number of connected links 
418 divided by the total number of links. There are N(N − 1) possible links 
419 for directed graphs and N(N
2
−1) for undirected graphs. (b) The measure 
420 of local interconnectivity between nodes is called clustering coeﬃcient, (Δi 
421 denotes the clustering coeﬃcient for node i and Δ is the coeﬃcient for the 
422 network); (c) The shortest path length of the network estimates the average 
423 shortest path between all pairs of randomly selected nodes; and (d) Degree 
424 distribution which gives the probability distribution P (k) of links of any 
425 number k, and p(k) gives the probability that a randomly selected node has 
426 exactly k links. The average number of links per node is given by < k >= 
427 k kp(k) and the variance of links < k
2 >= k k
2p(k). Where empirical 
428 sample data is used, p(k) = 
N
N
−
k 
1 
where Nk is the number of nodes with k 
429 links. 
430 Clustering in networks measures how interconnected each agent’s neigh­
431 bours are and is considered to be the hallmark of social and species oriented 
432 networks. Speciﬁcally, there should be an increased probability that two of 
433 an agent’s neighbours are also neighbours of one another. For each agent 
434 with ki neighbours the total number of all possible directed links between 
435 them is given by ki(ki − 1). Let Ei denote the actual number of links be­
436 tween agent i’s ki neighbours, viz. those of i’s ki neighbours who are also 
437 neighbours. The clustering coeﬃcient Δi for agent i is given by
�N
Ei i=1 ΔiΔi = and Δ = . (3)
ki(ki − 1) N 
438 The second term which gives the clustering coeﬃcient of the network as 
439 a whole is the average of all Δi’s . Note that the clustering coeﬃcient for an 
440 Erdo¨s-Renyi random graph is Δrandom = p where p is the same probability 
441 for any pair of nodes to be connected. This is because in a random graph 
442 the probability of node pairs being connected by edges are by deﬁnition 
443 independent, so there is no increase in the probability for two agents to 
444 be connected if they were neighbours of another agent than if they were 
445 not. A high clustering coeﬃcient for the network corresponds to high local 
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446 interconnectedness of a number of agents in the core. In an Erdo¨s-Renyi 
447 network, the degree distribution follows a Poisson distribution. In contrast, 
448 scale free networks have highly skewed distribution of links that follows a 
449 power law in the tails of the degree distribution, that is the probability of a 
450 node possessing k degrees is given by 
p(k) = k−α , (4) 
451 where α > 0 is called the power law exponent. Hence, there are some 
452 nodes which are very highly connected and many that are not. To generate 
453 power law statistics for nodes either in terms of their size or the numbers of 
454 links to/from them, Baraba´si and Albert (1999) proposed a process called 
455 preferential attachment, whereby nodes acquire size or numbers of links in 
456 proportion to their existing size or connectivity. 
457 An important discovery that was made by Watts (1999) and Watts and 
458 Strogatz (1998) with regard to socio-economic networks is that while small 
459 world networks like scale free networks have in-egalitarian degree distribution 
460 with some very highly connected nodes, the central tiering of highly clustered 
461 nodes which work as hubs for the peripheral nodes (who have few direct 
462 connections to others in the periphery) is a signature feature only of small 
463 worlds. In order to get the core-periphery structure with a highly clustered 
464 central core, we follow the suggestion in Zhou and Mondragon (2003) and 
465 include the scope for preferential attachment or assortative mixing among 
466 the nodes with large number of outdegrees and not just a preference for high 
467 degree nodes (disassortative mixing) by low degree nodes. Note, the hubs 
468 also facilitate short path lengths between two peripheral nodes. We have 
469 indicated how such a tiered structure arise in broker-dealer structures as the 
470 hub members minimize liquidity and collateral costs by implementing oﬀsets. 
471 Finally, the statistic that will be used to characterize high concentration of 
472 activity, one which is closely related to the stability of the ﬁnancial network is 
473 the eigenvector centrality statistic for the nodes characterizing CDS activity 
474 obtained for matrix Θ in (2). The algorithm that determines it assigns 
475 relative centrality scores to all nodes in the network based on the principle 
476 that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the 
477 node in question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. Denoting 
478 vi as the eigenvector centrality for the ith node, let the centrality score be 
479 proportional to the sum of the centrality scores of all nodes to which it is 
480 connected (ie. out degrees). Hence, 
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vi = θij vj . (5)
λ 
j 
481
 For the centrality measure, we take the largest real part of the dominant

482
 eigenvalue, λmax, of matrix Θ in (2) and the associated eigenvector. The i
th

483
 component of this eigenvector then gives the centrality score of the ith node

484
 in the network. Using vector notation for this, we obtain the eigenvector

485
 equation for matrix in (2) as:

Θv = λmax (Θ) v. (6) 
486
 As the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of a non-negative real matrix

487
 Θ in (2) has only non-negative components, highly central nodes are guar­

488
 anteed positive eigenvector values by Perron-Frobenius theorem (see, Meyer

489
 (2000), Chapter 8). Note, v is the right eigenvector of the matrix Θ and

490
 will be shown to be the relevant centrality measure for the design of a super­

491
 spreader tax.

492
 3.3. Economics Literature on Financial Networks 
493
 Pre 2007 ﬁnancial network models in the economics literature have yielded

494
 mixed results. An inﬂuential and early work on connectivity in a ﬁnancial

495
 network and that of ﬁnancial contagion is that of Allen and Gale (2001).

496
 They gave rise to a mistaken view (see, Battiston et al. (2009)) that fol­

497
 lows only in the case of homogenous graphs20, ie. increasing connectivity

498
 monotonically increases system stability in the context of diversiﬁcation of

499
 counterparty risk. A number of the analytical and numerically based stud­

500
 ies in ﬁnancial contagion work were conﬁned to Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs

501
 such as Nier et al. (2007) and Gai and Kapadia (2010) which are interest­

502
 ing in terms of qualitative understanding one needs to get but as ﬁnancial

503
 networks are far from random, they have some way to go.

504 As little empirical work has been done to date on network structures 
505 of the speciﬁc markets underpinning oﬀ-balance bank activity such as CDS 
20In a complete graph, if bank i’s total exposure is equally divided among its N − 1

counterparties, then risk is shared equally at the rate of N
1 
−1 . The demise of a single

counterparty has a very small impact on i. In contrast, Allen and Gale (2001) consider an

incomplete circle network where each bank is exposed to only one other for the full 100%

of its receivables, then the failure of any bank in the circle will bring the others down.

20 
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506
 responsible for triggering and propagating the 2007 crisis, it must be noted

507
 that the bulk of the empirical ﬁnancial network approach has been conﬁned

508
 to interbank markets for their role in the spread of ﬁnancial contagion (see,

509
 Furﬁne (2003) and Upper (2011)). However, the use of the entropy method21

510
 (see, Upper and Worms (2004) and Boss et al. (2004)) for the construction

511
 of the matrix of bilateral obligations of banks which results in a complete

512
 network structure for the system as a whole, greatly vitiates the potential

513
 for network instability or contagion. Recent work by Craig and von Peter

514
 (2010) using bilateral interbank data from German banks have identiﬁed the

515
 tiered core-periphery structure and ﬁnd that bilateral ﬂow matrix (X) in (1)

516
 unlike in a complete or as in a Erdo¨s-Renyi random networks is sparse in the

517
 following way:

CC CP 
X = . (7)
PC PP 
518
 Here, CC stands for the ﬁnancial ﬂows among the core banks in the centre

519
 of the network, CP stands for those between core and periphery banks, PC

520
 between periphery and core banks and PP stand for ﬂows between periphery

521
 banks. The sparseness of the matrix relates to the fact that PP ﬂows are

522
 zero and banks in the periphery of the network do not interact with one an­

523
 other. This structure resembles the small world network described in Section

524
 3.1 above as being a characterization of TITF structure in the core of the 
525
 network. Hence, the criticism Craig and von Peter level at extant ﬁnancial

526
 networks literature is worth stating here. They say that many interbank mod­

527
 els proposed in the economics literature (e.g. Allen and Gale (2001), Freixas

528
 et al. (2000), and Leitner (2005)) ignore the tiered structure and do not anal­

529
 yse it in any rigorous way : “the notion that banks build yet another layer

530
 of intermediation between themselves goes largely unnoticed in the banking

531
 literature”. Craig and von Peter (2010) ﬁnd that the tiered character of this

532
 market is highly persistent. This could coincide with an outcome of com­

533
 petitive co-evolution in that to retain status quo in market shares, the core

534
 banks are hugely geared to the arms race involved there (see, also Galbiati

535
 and Giansante (2010)). Craig and von Peter (2010) go on to note that “the

21For a recent criticism of the entropy method in the construction of networks, see, the 
2010 ECB Report on Recent Advances in Modeling Systemic Risk Using Network Analysis 
(ECB, 2010). 
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536 persistence of this tiered structure poses a challenge to interbank theories that 
537 build on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). If unexpected liquidity shocks were the 
538 basis for interbank activity, should the observed linkages not be as random 
539 as the shocks? Should the observed network not change unpredictably every 
540 period? If this were the case, it would make little sense for central banks and 
541 regulatory authorities to run interbank simulations gauging future contagion 
542 risks. The stability of the observed interbank structure suggests otherwise.” 
543 From our experience of mapping the ﬁnancial networks based on actual 
544 bilateral data of FIs for the Indian ﬁnancial system,22 there appears to be a 
545 distinct variation in the core-periphery hierarchical structure noted by Craig 
546 and von Peter (2010) in the diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial activities. In their 
547 derivatives or contingent claims exposures and obligations, FIs show a far 
548 more marked concentration in the core both in terms of ﬁnancial ﬂows and 
549 connectivity, with a few banks in the core and a large number of them in 
550 the periphery. In non-contingent claims based borrowing and lending the 
551 interbank market shows more diﬀusion in the core with a larger number of 
552 banks in the core. The least hierarchical is the RTGS payment and settle­
553 ments systems where there is a distinct lack of identiﬁable periphery banks. 
554 That the credit based interbank markets have diﬀerent network properties to 
555 RTGS payment and settlement systems has also been noted by Kyriakopou­
556 los et al. (2009).23 Their ﬁndings on the network topology of the Austrian 
557 payment and settlement systems have been found to correspond to the study 
558 of the Fedwire payment and settlement system by Soramaki et al. (2006). 
559 Bech and Enghin (2008) did a detailed study of the network topology of 
560 Fed Funds market and found that the clustering of the system was limited 
561 and that small banks lend more to big banks than to their own sized banks 
562 showing disassortative linkages. They found that this disassortativity was 
563 reduced when links were weighted by value of ﬂows. Hence, we emphasize 
564 the need for empirical calibrations that reﬂect actual market concentration in 
565 the ﬁnancial activity or the use of full bilateral data on ﬁnancial obligations 
566 between counterparties. 
567 Finally, the presence of highly connected and contagion causing players 
568 typical of a clustered complex system network perspective is to be contrasted 
22See, Reserve Bank of India Financial Stability Report, December 2011. 
23Note, as shown in Kyriakopoulos et al. (2009) the network mapping of electronic real 
time payment and settlement systems is highly sensitive to the time scale over which ﬂows 
are estimated. This problem is not something that has been resolved yet. 
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569
 with what some economists regard to be an equilibrium network. Recently,

570
 Babus (2009) states that in “an equilibrium network the degree of systemic

571
 risk, deﬁned as the probability that a contagion occurs conditional on one

572
 bank failing, is signiﬁcantly reduced”. Indeed, the premise of TITF is that

573
 the failure of a highly connected bank will increase the failure of another

574
 similarly bank, which we ﬁnd to be the empirical characteristic of the network

575
 topology of the CDS market involving US banks, indicates that the drivers

576
 of network formation in the real world are diﬀerent from those assumed in

577
 economic equilibrium models.

578
 Our analysis of the stability of highly clustered ﬁnancial networks has

579
 been inﬂuenced by the work of Robert May and studies on the spread of epi­

580
 demics in non-homogenous networks with hierarchies (see, Kao (2010, p.62).

581
 May (1972, 1974) seminaly extended the Wigner condition of eigenvalues for

582
 complete random matrices to sparse random networks. He was the ﬁrst to

583
 state that the stability of a dynamical network based system will depend on

584
 the size of the maximum eigenvalue of the weighted adjacency matrix of the

585
 network. Assuming the matrix entries are zero mean random variables, May

586
 (1974) derives the maximum eigenvalue of the network, which we denote as

587
 λmax, in terms of three network parameters p, the probability of connectiv­

588
 ity, N the number of nodes and σ which is the standard deviation of node

589
 strength. The May (1974) result states that network instability follows when

590

√
Npσ > 1. There is a trade oﬀ between heterogeneity in node strength, σ

591
 and connectivity, p, in order for the network to remain stable. In a non-zero

592
 mean random matrix, highly connected networks can remain stable only if

593
 they are homogenous in node strength, viz. σ should be very small. In net­

594
 works with high variance to mean ratio in degrees and with tiered hierarchies

595
 of highly connected nodes where there is higher probability that a node is

596
 connected to a highly connected one, the direction of the epidemic which

597
 starts in a central hub follows a distinct hierarchical pattern with the highly

598
 connected nodes being infected ﬁrst and the epidemic then cascading toward

599
 groups of nodes with smaller degrees, Kao (2010). Further, the epidemic

600
 dies out at great speed once the super-spreaders are eliminated. In contrast,

601
 in uncorrelated random graphs, the epidemic lasts longer and also reaches

602
 more nodes. For epidemic control, clustered networks enable targeting of

603
 speciﬁc individuals as opposed to inoculating the whole population in a ran­

604
 dom graph. Sinha (2005) and Sinha and Sinha (2006), also ﬁnd that while

605
 both the small world and the Erdo¨s-Renyi random graph show instability

according to the condition given by May (1974), the lack of structure in a
606
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607 random graph results in a worse capacity of the system to cope with the 
608 contagion. 
609 In terms of propagation of failure, therefore and as it will be shown, it 
610 is not true that ﬁnancial systems where no node is too interconnected or 
611 involved in a cluster (as in an Erdo¨s-Renyi random network) are necessarily 
612 easier to manage in terms of structural coherence and stability. Hence, we will 
613 report on the stability analysis of the empirically calibrated US CDS network 
614 and also of an equivalent random graph of the same size and functionality in 
615 terms of the CDS fair value ﬂows. The instability propagation in the highly 
616 clustered empirically based CDS network and the equivalent random graph 
617 is radically diﬀerent and the less interconnected system is in some respects 
618 more diﬃcult to manage. This suggests the need for caution in espousing 
619 an ideal network topology for ﬁnancial networks. This also underscores the 
620 importance of calibrations for networks in contagion analysis to be based 
621 on actual ﬁnancial ﬂows for the market or some close empirical proxies for 
622 network connectivity. 
623 4. Contagion and Stability Analysis 
624 The study of the topology of network in order to characterize its dy­
625 namical and stability properties has been actively studied especially in the 
626 context of ecology of species and in epidemiology. In ﬁnancial network model 
627 the analysis of contagion from speciﬁc node failure has used the classic Furﬁne 
628 (2003) methodology. 
629 4.1. Furﬁne (2003) Methodology : Failure of A Single Trigger bank at Initial 
630 Period 
631 We follow the round by round or sequential algorithm for simulating con­
632 tagion that is now well known from Furﬁne (2003). Starting with a trigger 
633 bank i that fails at time 0, we denote the set of banks that fail at each round 
634 or iteration by Dq, q = 1, 2, . . . . Note, the superscript q shows the qth 
635 iteration. The cascade of defaults occur in the following way: 
i Assuming tear ups but no novation of CDS contracts and zero recovery 
rate on the trigger bank i’s liabilities, bank j fails if its direct bilateral 
net loss of CDS cover vis-a´-vis the trigger bank i taken as a ratio of its 
capital (reported in the ﬁfth column of Tables A.4, A.5 in the Appendix 
24 
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A) is greater than a threshold ρ. That is, 
(xij − xji)+ 
> ρ. 
Cj 
636 This threshold ρ signiﬁes a percentage of bank capital which can be re­
637 garded as a sustainable loss. This is assumed to be the same for all 
638 banks. 
ii A second order eﬀect of contagion follows if there is some bank z, z /∈ D1 , 
ie. those that did not fail in round 1, suﬀers losses due to counterparty 
failure such that the losses are greater than or equal to a proportion ρ of 
its capital: � � 
(xiz − xzi)+ + j∈D1 (xjz − xzj ) 
> ρ. 
Cz 
639 The summation term aggregates the net loss of CDS cover to z from all 
640 banks j, j = i , which demised in the ﬁrst iteration. �
thiii This then iterates to the q round of defaults if there is some bank v, 
v /∈ D1 ∪ D2 · · · ∪ Dq−1 , ie. has not failed till q − 1, such that 
(xiv − xvi)+ + j∈ qs−1 Ds (xjv − xvj ) 
> ρ. 
Cv 
641 iv The contagion is assumed to have ended at the round q#when there are 
642 no more banks left or none of those that have survived fail at q# . 
643 4.2. Network Stability Analysis 
644 Using the matrix Θ in (2) whose entries give bilateral net liabilities of 
645 bank i to j as a ratio of bank j’s capital, in matrix notation the equations 
646 for the dynamics of the cascade of failure given the failure of the trigger 
647 bank can be given as follows. Consider the column vector Uq with elements 
648 (u1q, u2q, . . . , unq) which give the probability of ‘infecting’ at the qth iteration. 
649 We have uiq = 1 = uiq 
1 are those banks that fail at the qth iteration and infect 
650 all non-failed counterparties with probability 1. Those that fail prior to q 
651 have uiq = 0, viz. they do not infect anybody. The non-failed banks at q 
652 have 0 < uiq < 1 and at q + 1 their probability of failure/infecting is given 
653 by : 
25 
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� � 
� (xji − xij)+ 
Uiq+1 = (1 − ρ)uiq + ujq 1 (8)Ci0j 
Ciq � (xji − xij)+ 1= (1 − ρ) 1 − 
Ci0 
+ 
Ci0 
ujq, 0 < uiq+1 < 1. 
j 
654 Here, in the ﬁrst term in (8) ρ can be taken as the capital buﬀer for

655
 CDS assets, it can be considered to be equivalent to the rate of cure in the

656
 epidemic literature. Thus, (1 − ρ) gives worst case rate of failure for a bank.

657 It is convenient to assume the initial ui0 = 
ρ while = 
Ciq .
(1−ρ) uiq 1 − Ci0 
658
 That is, the probability of failure is determined by the rate at which bank

659 i’s capital is depleted by losses from failed banks. The second term in (8) 
660 sums up the infection rates sustained from its failed counterparties. Note, 
therefore, u1 = 1 or i fails at q + 1 when the R.H.S of (8) is greater than 661 iq+1 
662 1. 
663 Thus, in matrix notation the dynamics of bank failures is given by: 
Uq+1 = [Θ
� + (1 − ρ)I] Uq. (9) 
664 Here, Θ� is the transpose of the matrix in (2) with each element Θ�ij = Θji 
665 and I is the identity matrix. Recall the elements of the 2nd row of Θ� take the 
666 following form with for example, positive entries in (10) for counterparties 1, 
667 3 and N and with Θ22 = 0 to indicate that an FI does not ‘infect’ itself: 
Θ�2t = 
x12 − x21 
, 0,
x32 − x23 
, . . . , 
xN 2 − x2N 
. (10)
C20 C20 C20 
668 The system stability of (9) will be evaluated on the basis of the power 
669
 iteration of the initial matrix Q = [Θ� + (1 − ρ)I]. From (9), Uq takes the

670 form: 
Uq = [Θ
� + (1 − ρ)I]q U0 = QqU0. (11) 
671 It can be shown that the stability of the system is governed by the max­
672 imum eigenvalue of the initial matrix Q = [Θ� + (1 − ρ)I] when it satisﬁes 
673 the conditions: 
λmax(Q) < 1. (12) 
26 
λmax(Θ
�) < ρ. (13) 
674
 Finally, λmax(Θ
�) = λmax(Θ), that is the maximum eigenvalue of a real

675
 non-negative matrix is equal to that of its transpose. The Furﬁne (2003)

676
 contagion analysis highlights how a FI fails due to it exposures to the trigger

677
 bank, and hence as will be shown, the stabilization of the ﬁnancial network

678
 system will exploit the role of row sums in Θ� as in a typical row given in

679
 (10). However, for purposes of managing systemic risk and the design of

680
 a super-spreader tax on a FI to have it internalize the cost to others from

681
 the excessive liabilities and connectivity that it has, we will use the right

682 dominant eigenvector from matrix Θ which was deﬁned in (6). 
683 4.3. Super-spreader Tax 
684 Financial systems determined by an initial matrix Q = [Θ� + (1 − ρ)I] 
685
 in (9)that are prone to instability and contagion will have λmax(Q) > 1 and

686 where pre-funded capital thresholds such as ρ > 0 apply, instability ensues at 
687 λmax(Θ) > ρ. There are 4 ways in which stability of the ﬁnancial network can 
688 be achieved: (i) constrain the bilateral exposure of ﬁnancial intermediaries; 
689 (ii) ad hocly increase the threshold ρ in (9,11); (iii) change the topology of 
690
 the network (iv) Levy a capital surcharge or a capital buﬀer commensurate

691
 to the right eigenvector centrality of a FI in (6). The ﬁrst two measures do

692
 not price in the negative externality from systemic risk associated with the

693
 failure of highly weighted network central nodes. Network topologies emerge

694 endogenously and are hard to manipulate exogenously. 
695
 The aim of the super-spreader tax is to have ﬁnancial intermediaries with

696
 high eigenvector centrality parameters to internalize the costs that they in­

697
 ﬂict on others by their failure and to mitigate their impact on the system

698
 by reducing their contribution to network instability as given by λmax(Θ
�).

699 Hence, this can be considered to be a Pigovian tax. 
700 Critical to the von-Mises power iteration algorithm (see Ralston (1965)) 
701 for the calculation of λmax(Θ
�) are the row sums Si of the ith row in Θ�, � 1 � 
Si = θji = (xji − xij )+ . 24 (14)
Cij j 
24It should be noted that the upper bound of the maximum eigenvalue �λmax(Θ�) is given 
by maximum of row sums of the matrix Θ� : λmax ≤ �Θ��∞ = maxi j Θji = maxi Si. 
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702
 We create a new row sum Si 
# , for each node so that a super-spreader 
703
 tax denoted as τ(vi) applies to the capital of the i
th node in proportion to 
704
 its right eigenvector centrality vi deﬁned in (6): 
S# 
� 
θ# 
1 � 
i = ji = (1 + τ(vi)) Ci 
(xji − xij )+ . (15) 
j j 
705
 Thus,

Si 
# < Si for τ(vi) > 0. (16) 
706
 We set the super-spreader tax :

τ(vi) = αvi, 0 < α ≤ 1 or α > 0. (17) 
707
 The new matrix associated with Si 
#(α), for all i, will be denoted as

708
 Θ�#(α). The alpha parameter when set at 0 obtains the λmax associated with

709
 the untaxed initial matrix Θ�. When α = 1, each node is exactly penalized

710
 by vi, which yields the λmax for Θ
�#(α = 1). Considering, 0 < α ≤ 1, there

711
 is a monotonic reduction in the λmax associated with the matrices Θ
�#(α) 
712 corresponding to the monotonic reduction in row sums Si 
#(α = 1) < <· · · 
713
 Si 
#(α = 0.75) < < Si 
#(α = 0.5) < < Si(α = 0). Clearly, the size of α,
· · · · · · 
714
 in particular if α > 1 is needed to stabilize the system, the sustainability of

715
 such a market for risk sharing is in question.

716
 The nature of the systemic risk stabilization super-spreader fund is that

717
 it operates like an escrow fund. The super-spreader taxes that are collected

718
 aim to cover the losses that the most connected nodes will inﬂict on their di­

719
 rect ‘big’ neighbours in the ﬁrst tier. The empirical section will demonstrate

720
 the extent to which a super-spreader tax has to be levied in order to stabi­

721
 lize the system. It is designed to work in a clustered hierarchical network

722
 where contagion takes a speciﬁc pathway amongst the central tier if a highly

723
 connected node fails. In fact, often reducing λmax to a desired level may not

724
 be technically feasible and may involve exorbitant levels of tax. Instead, we

725
 aim to secure a super-spreader lite escrow fund which will escrow suﬃcient

Here, �.�∞ inﬁnity norm of a matrix is the maximum of row sums Si where Si = Θji.j 
Hence, high connectivity to large number of counterparties and also large exposures relative 
to capital contribute to the high row sums for FIs and with the largest of these being the 
upper bound of λmax(Θ
�). For a more detailed discussion of this and how stabilization 
using alternative applications of the right eigenvector centrality of FIs, see Markose (2012). 
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726
 funds to cover the largest amount of ﬁrst round losses from the failure of the

727 dominant bank in terms of eigenvector centrality. 
728 5. Empirical Results 
729 5.1. Empirical (Small World) Network Algorithm 
730 We study the US banks involved in the CDS market as recorded in the 
731
 FDIC Call Reports for 2007 and 2008 Q4. In order to exclusively focus on the

732
 systemic risk from potential counterparty risk leading to loss of cover from

733
 CDS, FDIC data is obtained for CDS gross notional (buy and sell), Gross

734
 positive fair value (GNFV), Gross negative fair value (GNFV) and Tier 1

735
 capital. Tables A.4, A.5 in the Appendix A report the key data for 2007

736 and 2008 Q4. 
737
 As discussed, we use an algorithm that assigns network links on the basis

738
 of market shares (see, Tables A.4, A.5 in Appendix A) in order to reﬂect the

739
 very high concentration of network connections among the top 6 banks in

740
 terms of bilateral interrelationships. We ﬁrst construct the X matrix given

741
 in (1). Our algorithm assigns in degrees and out degrees for a bank in terms

742
 of its respective market shares for gross notional values for CDS purchases

743
 and sales. Thus, in 2007 Q4 J.P. Morgan with a 50% share on both sides

744
 of the market will approximately have 15 in and out degrees. The choice of

745
 these 15 banks J.P. Morgan has out degrees to is assortative, i.e. 15 banks

746 are chosen from the largest to the smallest in terms of their CDS activity. 
747 • SiG : Banki market share in terms of the gross notional on the sell side 
748 of CDS 
749 SB : Banki market share in terms of the gross notional on the buy side • i 
750 of CDS 
751 • Gi : Gross Negative Fair Value for which Banki is a guarantor vis-a´-vis 
752 its counterparties 
753 • Bi : Gross Positive Fair Value for which Banki is beneﬁciary vis-a´-vis 
754 its counterparties 
755 The algorithm then allocates to each row bank i’s counterparties j, a value 
756 of i’s GNFV equal to Sj
BGi and if j Sj
BGi < Gi, then bank i allocates the 
757 remaining to the external non-US bank entity which is the N + 1 agent. The 
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Figure 3: The Empirically Constructed CDS Network (Bilaterally Netted) for US Banks 
and Non-US Financial Intermediaries (Triangle): Empirical Small World Network in 
Tiered Layout (LHS 2007 Q4 and RHS 2008 Q4). 
758
 row sums of matrix X in (1) are made to satisfy the GP F Vj or Bj for each 
759
 bank, the following allocation rule is used such that if Sj
B 
i Gi < Bj , the 
760
 remaining is bought from the external entity. 
761
 In order to determine each bank’s share of GNFV to the US non-bank 
762
 sector which includes Monolines and hedge funds we use data from Table 
763
 RCL-16a, “Derivatives and Oﬀ-Balance Sheet Items”, from FDIC Call Re­
764
 ports which gives a sectoral break down. Finally, the share of a bank’s 
765
 GNFV for the entity called ‘others’ which denotes non-US counterparties 
766
 is obtained as a balancing item to satisfy the condition given in (1) that 
767 i Gi = j Bj . The gross ﬂow X matrix so constructed using the above 
algorithm is a sparse matrix with a very high concentration of activity. We 768 
769 then derive the bilaterally netted exposures between a pair of banks which 
770
 can be read oﬀ accordingly as (xij − xji) with xij denoting GNFV for CDS 
771
 protection from i to j and xji is GNFV protection cover from j to i. Hence, 
772
 the size of bilateral net sell amount is given by (xij − xji) > 0. The resulting 
773
 network for this is graphed below in Figure 3. 
774
 In Figure 3, red nodes denote net CDS sellers and blue nodes are net CDS 
775
 buyers. The main diﬀerence between the US CDS networks for 2007 Q4 and 
776
 2008 Q4 is that the dominant role of the Monolines and hedge funds as net 
777
 CDS sellers (largest red coloured node, LHS) has almost all been phased out 
30 
Figure 4: Erdo¨s-Renyi Random Graph ( Equivalent to 2008 Q4 CDS Network in Figure 
3 RHS) for US Banks and Non US Sector (Triangle): Absence of an identiﬁable core-
periphery structure 
778 by the end of 2008. By 2008 Q4 J.P. Morgan has increased its dominance as 
779
 the sole member of the inner core and non-US banks (red triangle) become

780
 net protection providers. Hence, there are clear threats from the non-US

781
 sector, viz. European banks, which we will brieﬂy analyse. The other top

782
 5 US banks remain in the central core of the network in somewhat weaker

783
 positions with the exception of Goldman Sachs which migrates more to the

784
 centre in 2008 Q4. Over 80% of the banks are in the periphery with almost no

785
 connectivity among themselves manifesting a very sparse adjacency matrix.

786
 The tiered layout in Figure 3 is constructed in the following way. We

787
 take the range of connectivity of all banks as a ratio of each bank’s total in

788
 and out degrees divided by that of the most connected bank. Banks that are

789
 ranked in the top 20 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner core. This is

790
 followed by a mid core between 80 and 50 percentile and a 3rd tier between

791
 10 and 50 percentile. Those with connectivity ratio less than 10 percentile

792
 are categorized as the periphery.

793
 The links are weighted and thicker the links, the larger the size of their

794
 obligations. The links are colour coded. The triangle entity representing non­

795
 US banks constitutes the mid-core. So the yellow links show where the second

796
 tier (mid core) banks are oﬀering protection. As can be seen, the banks with

797
 the pink arrows in the core almost always interact with one another.

798
 Table 1 gives the network statistics for the empirically constructed CDS

799
 networks and also for the equivalent random graph representing the 2008

800
 CDS data given in Figure 4. The random graph is constructed with the

801
 same connectivity of about 6% as the market share based empirically con­
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Table 1: Network Statistics for Degree Distribution for CDS Network: Small World Net­
work Properties Compared with Random Graph with Same Connectivity 
802 structed network for 2008 Q4 (see, Appendix B for the algorithm used in 
803
 the construction of the random graph.) The main diﬀerence in the network

804
 statistics for the 2007 Q4 and 2008 Q4 CDS networks is the jump in the

805
 clustering coeﬃcient in 2008 Q4 to 62% from 35% while connectivity has

806
 fallen from about 8% to 6%. The random graph has a much lower cluster

807
 coeﬃcient of 10% compared to that of about 62% for the empirical CDS net­

808
 work based on the 2008 Q4 data. Also, the random graph has substantially

809
 low variance to mean ratio than the empirically calibrated CDS networks.

810
 The highly asymmetric nature of the empirical CDS network is manifested

811
 in the large kurtosis or fat tails in degree distribution which is characterized

812
 by a few (two banks in this case) which have a relatively large number of in

813
 degrees (up to 14) while many have only a few (as little as 1).

814
 5.2. Eigenvector Centrality and Furﬁne Stress Test Results 
815
 Here we will investigate the idea about the role of super-spreaders of con­

816
 tagion in terms of their network connectivity, dominance as CDS protection

817
 sellers and their right eigenvector centrality. As already noted, in the post

Lehman era of 2008 Q4, the dominance of J.P. Morgan is the key aspect of
818

32

Table 2: 2008 Q4 Eigenvector Centrality and Furﬁne Stress Tests (for selected banks) with 
6% capital threshold. 
819 the US sector of the CDS market. Table 2 shows that in terms of connectiv­
820
 ity, J.P. Morgan stands out by a large margin with 55% share of total out

821
 degrees. Citibank has 12.5% of outdegreees while Goldman Sachs and HSBC

822
 come in at third place with a modest 9.3% share. In terms of eigenvector

823
 centrality which correlates best with contagion losses the trigger bank inﬂicts

824
 on others, again J.P. Morgan has eigenvector centrality of 0.749 followed by

825
 Others at 0.64 and Goldman Sachs and Citibank at 0.1 and 0.086 respec­

826
 tively. This is borne out in the Furﬁne stress tests results given in Table 2

827
 and Figure 5. Over all, J.P. Morgan as trigger bank results in the failure

828
 of Morgan Stanley, Citibank, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and

829
 Merrill Lynch in the ﬁrst tier of the network. This results in $55.19 bn loss

830
 of Tier 1 Capital to the direct counterparties of J.P. Morgan. One of our ob­

831
 jectives is to see if the super-spreader tax escrow fund can raise this amount

832
 of funds.
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Figure 5: Instability propagation in Clustered CDS Network(2008 Q4 LHS) and in Equiva­
lent Random Network (RHS) NB: Concentric circles mark the iterations q given in section 
4.1; failed banks are black nodes and green nodes are those that are ‘hit’ but do not fail. 
833 5.3. Contagion: Clustered Small World vs Random CDS Network 
834
 For the 2008 Q4 period, we will compare the CDS network stability of

835
 a random graph of the same size, connectivity and gross ﬂow functionalities

836
 with that of the more clustered empirically based CDS network. Some very

837
 interesting issues, discussed in Section 4, are highlighted here. Recall the

838
 marked diﬀerence in structure is the clustering coeﬃcient of the two networks

839
 and high variance to mean ratios (see, Table 1). The high clustering of the

840
 small world network in regard of what we understand to be the most likely

841
 structure for the CDS network in order to reﬂect the high concentration of

842
 exposures between 5 or so counterparties, results in a similar pattern in the

843
 propagation of ﬁnancial contagion from the demise of the dominant bank,

844
 J.P. Morgan. As shown in Figure 5 (LHS) in the clustered network, there 
845
 are only direct failures in a closed sector rather than higher order failures

846
 spreading to the whole system. It is, ofcourse, cold comfort that the ﬁrst

847
 order shock wipes out the top 5 banks. Together they lead to the failure

848
 of the non-bank US CDS users. In contrast, in the random graph, while no

849
 node is either too big or too interconnected, the substantial part of the system

850
 unravels (up to 25 banks fail) in a series of multiple knock on eﬀects. Note

851
 the concentric circles denote the sequence of cascade or iteration q described

852
 in section 4.1. The black nodes are the failed banks and the green ones are

853
 those that are hit but do not fail.
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854 5.4. Quantiﬁcation and Evaluation of the Super-spreader Tax (2008 Q4) 
855 With a maximum eigenvalue of 1.18 for the Θ matrix in 2008 Q4, the 
856 system is deemed unstable and the losses to the system as a whole from the 
857 failure of the eigenvector dominant bank, J.P. Morgan, remains substantial 
858 with the failure of 5 top banks (see Figure 5 LHS). Socialized losses have 
859 to be internalized by the banks themselves. In this section, we will evaluate 
860 the super-spreader tax based on the theoretical derivation in Section 4.3 and 
861 equation (17). A surcharge on bank capital commensurate to the eigenvector 
862 centrality of a bank using the formula in equation (17) τ(vi) = αvi is applied 
863 to the rows of Θ� for diﬀerent values of 0 < α ≤ 1. Note the eigenvector 
864 centrality for the top 5 US banks, Monolines and Others is given in Table 2. 
865 Compared to the target maximum eigenvalue of 1.06, the application of the 
866 capital surcharge in (17) to the matrix Θ� results in some small reduction in 
867 λmax. 
868 Figure 6 gives the rate of super-spreader capital surcharge that needs 
869 to be levied on the banks in order that they internalize the systemic risk 
870 costs arising solely from their network centrality. The super-spreader tax 
871 rate is obtained by multiplying the eigenvector centrality of each node vi by 
872 the alpha parameter given in equation (17) which can then reduce the λmax 
873 of the matrix Θ�. Table 3 will focus on the case of α = 0.125 for which 
874 we ﬁnd that the super-spreader escrow fund can stabilize the system. It is 
875 important to see if the super-spreader escrow fund can obtain suﬃcient funds 
876 which can cover the Tier 1 capital losses sustained (approximately $67 bn 
877 in the absence of any pre-existing threshold and $55 bn if a 6% threshold 
878 exists) when the most eigenvector dominant bank J.P. Morgan fails. What is 
879 clear from the analyses is that in the post Lehman period, the systemically 
880 important players in the US sector of the CDS market are J.P. Morgan and 
881 the non-US European banks taken in aggregate form as Others. The bulk of 
882 the Pigovian taxes fall on these two entities and only four other US banks 
883 need to be levied a non-zero tax on the basis of their network centrality 
884 parameter to fully price in the potential threat to the tax payer if they fail. 
885 As shown in Figure 6 and Table 3, J.P. Morgan’s capital surcharge stands 
886 at about 9.37%, 8.04% for the non-US banks (Others), 1.372% for Goldman 
887 Sachs, 0.37% for HSBC, 1.077% for Citibank and 0.77% for Bank of America. 
888 Table 3 gives the amounts that will accrue in the super-spreader fund and we 
889 verify that this will cover over $ 55.19 bn losses that will be incurred by the 
890 demise of the 5 top tier banks due to the failure of the dominant eigenvector 
891 central bank, J.P. Morgan. 
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Figure 6: Super-spreader Tax Rates On Banks and Alpha (Equation 17) to Achieve Dif­
ferent Levels of Network Stability (Vertical line shows the tax rates and alpha necessary 
to secure the super-spreader lite funds necessary to $55.19 bn 1st round losses of dominant 
eigenvector central bank. 
36

Table 3: Super-spreader Tax Escrow Fund (Total and selected banks) and Value of Round 
1 Tier 1 Capital Losses (Super-spreader Tax ($bns) calculated by multiplying Tier1 capital 
by the tax rate (%)). 
37

892 6. Concluding Remarks 
893 This paper investigated the systemic risk posed by the topological fragility 
894
 of the CDS market due to the concentration in CDS exposures between few

895
 highly connected US banks. To date, till the work of Craig and von Peter

896
 (2010), ﬁnancial network modellers have failed to suﬃciently focus on the

897
 core-periphery structure of ﬁnancial intermediaries. A large number of ﬁ­

898
 nancial network models have either assumed a Erdo¨s-Renyi random network

899
 structure (see, Nier et al. (2007)) or that of a complete graph constructed by

900
 entropy methods. The entropy based models are known not to produce ﬁ­

901
 nancial contagion with the failure of any trigger bank (see, Upper and Worms

902
 (2004)). The core-periphery tiered network is particularly relevant for deriva­

903
 tives markets. The framework we use to build an empirically based network

904
 for the CDS obligations primarily between US banks and an aggregated non­

905
 US sector reveals the high clustering phenomena of small world networks

906
 along with a sparse adjacency matrix. We used the market share of CDS

907 activity by banks to determine the network structures as discussed above. 
908
 We have characterized TITF phenomena of the CDS market with the

909
 tiered structure given in Figure 3. The 2008 Q4 CDS network is seen to

910
 have substantially more clustering than in 2007 Q4 and gives evidence of the

911
 greater concentration of CDS exposures among even fewer US banks than

912
 in 2007. The threat to the US sector of the CDS market primarily from

913
 the European banks has been identiﬁed in the post Lehman period. The

914
 clustered network as seen in Figure 4 showed the radically diﬀerent way in

915
 which contagion propagates in contrast with an Erdo¨s-Renyi network. This

916
 is well understood in network models of epidemics, but not so much in ﬁnan­

917
 cial models. Clustered small world network structure has some capacity for

918
 containment of contagion and in complex system terms these highly intercon­

919
 nected multi-hub based systems can have some stabilizing eﬀects compared to

920
 the unstructured random graphs. However, it is clear that the increased ca­

921
 pacity to bear the ﬁrst order shocks by the hub entities could only be achieved

922
 by installing ‘super-spreader reserves’, overturning the current practice of le­

923 niency in this direction. 
924
 The ﬁnancial network implied by the bilateral exposures given in a matrix

925
 such as Θ� in section 4 is examined for its stability in terms of its maximum

926
 eigenvalue. We found the empirically calibrated CDS network for the bilat­

927 erally netted exposures for the US FDIC banks for 2008 Q4 has maximum 
928 eigenvalue of about 1.18. The network shows that J.P. Morgan is the most 
38 
929 dominant bank in regard to eigenvector centrality, followed closely by the 
930 European banks and then only by a long margin by other US banks such 
931 as Goldman Sachs and Citibank. In order for banks to internalize the sys­
932 temic risk from their high network centrality, we recommend that banks be 
933 taxed by a progressive tax rate based on their eigenvector centrality and to 
934 escrow these funds. This is the ﬁrst operationalization of this concept with 
935 the application of the super-spreader tax demonstrated to better stabilize 
936 the matrix of netted liabilities of ﬁnancial intermediaries. We ‘back tested’ 
937 the capacity of this fund to cover the maximum losses from the failure of the 
938 most network central bank. The stability analysis is one that can be used to 
939 evaluate the adequacy of the amounts of collateral or capital to absorb losses 
940 from a potential failure of counterparties even in a Central Clearing Platform 
941 without tax payer bailouts. Further experimentation with a multi-agent ﬁ­
942 nancial network model is needed to answer questions such as: how well will 
943 the super-spreader tax fund perform, one which is based only on unweighted 
944 eigenvector centrality of the ﬁnancial intermediaries which requires much less 
945 information ? How will banks change their behaviour when faced by the full 
946 cost of being TITF ? Can the super-spreader tax be applied and altered like 
947 traﬃc congestion pricing scheme as the behaviour of agents adapt to the 
948 regulatory changes (see Markose et al. (2007))? 
949 It is our view that the size of derivatives markets and CDS markets, in 
950 particular, far exceed their capacity to internalize the potential losses that 
951 follow from the failure of highly connected ﬁnancial intermediaries. The large 
952 negative externalities that arise from a lack of robustness of the CDS ﬁnancial 
953 network from the demise of a big CDS seller further undermines the justiﬁ­
954 cation in Basel II and III that banks be permitted to reduce capital on assets 
955 that have CDS guarantees. We recommend that the Basel II provision for 
956 capital reduction on bank assets that have CDS cover should be discontin­
957 ued. Banks should be left free to seek unfunded CDS cover for bank assets 
958 without the incentive of capital reduction and leverage. Indeed, this may 
959 enhance price discovery role of the CDS market relating to the probability 
960 of default of reference assets or entities. 
961 Appendix A. FDIC Data 
39

Table A.4: FDIC Data (2007 Q4) for 33 US Banks With CDS Positions ($ bn) 
40 
41 
Table A.5: FDIC Data (2008 Q4) for 27 US Banks With CDS Positions ($ bn) 
962 Appendix B. Random Network Algorithm 
963 The algorithm that creates a random network of CDS obligations proceeds 
964 on the following steps: 
965 1. An adjacency matrix A(N × N) is created where each element has 
966 value 1 with probability p (this probability is set to be equal to the 
967 connectivity of the empirical network we want to compare with), 0 
968 otherwise. 
969 2. A matrix R(N × N) of random numbers is created where each element 
970 rij is randomly drawn from an uniform distribution in the range [0, 1]. 
971 3. The matrix B(N × N) of random values is generated as follows: B = 
972 A∗R(element by element multiplication). The matrix B is now a sparse 
973 matrix with many zero elements. 
4. The ﬁnal ﬂow matrix corresponding to X in equation (1) of CDS obli­
gations X is deﬁned as 
Γ 
X = B� � . 
i j bij 
974 Here, Γ is the total CDS GNFV in the market as required by the 
975 empirically constructed matrix 
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